There is a growing body of literature mentioning the slow pace of energy technological progress as compared to other technologies like information technology (IT), but the reasons why energy sector is perplexed by slow innovation remain unexplained. Based on a variety-expanding endogenous technological change model, this paper provides a rigorous economic exposition of the mechanism that underlies the slow progress of energy technological innovation. We show that in decentralized market equilibrium the growth rate of energy technology variety is lower than that of IT variety. This stems from both market fundamentals where the homogeneity of end-use energy goods is less likely to harness the pecuniary externality embedded in the household's love-for-variety preference, and technology fundamentals where the capital-intensiveness of energy technology inhibits the non-pecuniary technological externality due to knowledge spillovers. We further show that a social planner solution can promote energy technological progress, yet still cannot achieve an outcome in which energy technology variety grows faster than IT variety. By targeting subsidies on energy technology R&D and the use of intermediate primary energy inputs by secondary energy producers, the decentralized market equilibrium can achieve an outcome in which energy technology grows faster than IT.
Introduction
In 1969, the Apollo mission succeeded in achieving the goal of landing the first human on the Moon. This greatest achievement in human history not only created profound economic, political, and cultural impacts, but also laid the foundation for advancements in many areas of technology. Among other things, one is electronic and information technology (IT) that controls orbital spaceflight and long-distance telecommunications, and the other is solar cell technology that provides electrical power for the lunar flights. This historical event marks the same starting point in time for the inventions of IT and solar technologies, but afterwards the development of both technologies proceed quite differently and demonstrate diverging trajectories of technological progress.
Fabricated in the late 1960s, early applications of solar or photovoltaic (PV) cell in spacecraft were followed by commercial production for niche markets in the 1970-1980s, and today this industry still struggles to survive, since the costs for solar cell-generated electricity remain well above conventional fossil energy alternatives without massive subsidies. There have been many quite developments in PV cell technologies over the past several decades, but none have radically altered the evolutionary pattern of innovation, which over time looks like a relatively smooth progression (Henderson and Newell, 2010; Newell, 2011) . In contrast, successive waves of IT revolution have performed new tasks, many of which would earlier have been all but inconceivable. Semiconductor firms designed early transistors and integrated circuit (IC) chips in response to government demand for costly defense and space programs in the 1960s. Just within a few years, they were selling inexpensive chips for consumer products like radios and TV when electronic products began penetrating into individual families during the 1970s. IC chips then led to microprocessors and microprocessors led to the revolution of mobile telephones and personal computers during the 1980-1990s, and contributed to the popularization of software, internet, portable devices, and wireless applications today (Berndt and Rappaport, 2001) . Technological innovations in IT also stimulated widespread application in many other industries and spawned countless further innovations there that transformed the models of businesses worldwide (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2003) . As a result, although IT and PV cell technologies began at about the same time, sales of IT-related electronic products grew much faster, by 2012 reaching $250 billion worldwide as compared with solar PV sale revenues of just $17 billion (Marketbuzz, 2013) .
Extending to the broad set of energy-related technologies (i.e., oil, gas, coal, hydropower, nuclear, geothermal, solar, wind) , a real fact is that entire energy sectors face a surprisingly slow pace of innovation and technological progress, even if countries in the world have shown strong interests in innovation in energy sectors (particularly invention of carbon-free renewable energy technologies) as a solution to the pressing challenge of energy security and climate mitigation (Margolis and Kammen, 1999a,b; Nemet and Kammen, 2007; Popp et al., 2009; Henderson and Newell, 2010; Newell, 2011) .
Viewed from the standpoint of innovation inputs -R&D spending, public expenditure on energy R&D remains dramatically low over the past several decades. 1 For example, over the time period 1974-2009 the US government spending on energy R&D is dramatically low with a level of less than $10 billion annually, as compared to other budget categories like defense, health care, and space programs with each receiving a budget of more than $100 billions (U.S. Department of Energy, 2010; Henderson and Newell, 2010) . The International Energy Agency (IEA) member countries also experience a trend of underinvestment in energy R&D, with total public budgets for energy R&D in all IEA countries declining in real terms over the past 30 years. The relative share of energy R&D in total R&D budget has declined significantly from 12% in 1981 to 4% in 2008, and expenditure on energy R&D is about 0.03% of GDP in 2008 (IEA, 2010 . 2 Meanwhile, for private R&D spending firms in almost any industry seek to innovate themselves for meeting the changing market demands, but energy industry is an exception with sharp declines in R&D spending. In the early 1990s, when R&D intensity (R&D expenditure as a share of sales revenues) across all US industries averaged 3-4 percent, that intensity in energy industries is less than 1%. More recently, the industry-wide average increased somewhat, to about 3.4 percent of revenues, while the figure for energy sector R&D dropped to only 0.1 percent (Margolis and Kammen, 1999a,b; Neuhoff, 2005; Henderson and Newell, 2010; NSF, 2012) .
Moreover, from the standpoint of innovation outputs -patenting, it also shows a slow pace of technological innovation in energy sectors. The number of energy-specific patents dramatically falls over time as an outcome of the declining energy R&D spending, with a number of 100-150 patents granted per year. This number is orders of magnitude smaller than the total number of granted patents which amounts to 100-150 thousand per year (Margolis and Kammen, 1999a,b; Nemet and Kammen, 2007). 3 Given the urgency and novelty of the above-described issues related to energy technological innovation, it is not surprisingly that a growing body of literature has discussed the slow progress of energy technology with some proposals of innovation-enhancing policy responses (Noberg-Bohm, 1 The only exceptions are previous peak spending during the late 1970s due to the Arab Oil Embargo and year 2009 stimulus spending for recovery from economic recessions.
2000; Holdren and Sagar, 2002; Grubb, 2004; Jaffe et al., 2005; Gallagher et al., 2006 Gallagher et al., , 2012 Sagar and van der Zwaan, 2006; Nemet and Kammen, 2007; Anadon and Holdren 2009; Narayanamurti et al., 2009; Newell, 2008 Newell, , 2010 Newell, , 2011 Anadon, 2010; Grübler et al. 2012) . While these existing works have the virtue of contributing to potential policy recipes for accelerating energy innovation (normative issues), the limitation is that they all lack a rigorous analysis of the basic positive issue: why energy sector is often perplexed by a slow pace of technological progress compared to fast-innovation sectors like IT. A deep exposition of this positive issue is particularly helpful, because without a full understanding of the mechanism that underlies energy technological innovation, it would become difficult to serve the purpose of designing appropriate policy responses for accelerating energy technological progress. Therefore, to fill this gap in the existing literature, our work contributes to a rigorous economic exposition of the basic mechanism that helps explain the slow pace of energy technological progress.
Building on a variety-expanding endogenous technological change model, we show that in decentralized market equilibrium the growth rate of energy technology variety is lower than that of IT variety. This stems from the fact that in market fundamentals the homogeneity of end-use energy goods is less likely to harness the pecuniary externality embedded in the household's love-for-variety preference, and in technological fundamentals the capital-intensiveness of energy technology inhibits the non-pecuniary technological externality due to knowledge spillovers. 4 Moreover, it is shown that a social planner solution can accelerate the speed of energy technological progress, but still cannot achieve an outcome in which energy technology variety grows faster than IT variety. Finally, by targeting the subsidies on energy technology R&D and the use of intermediate primary energy inputs by secondary energy producers, the decentralized market equilibrium can achieve an outcome in which energy technology variety grows faster than IT variety.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We begin in Sections 2-3 by describing the variety-expanding endogenous technological change model and characterization of the decentralized market equilibrium. We continue in Sections 4-5 by investigating the balanced growth path and transitional dynamics of the model. As a comparison to the decentralized market equilibrium, Sections 6-7 present a social optimal solution and efficiency-improving policy intervention that helps accelerate energy technological innovation. Section 8 concludes.
The Model

The Household
Consider that the economy is in continuous time  [0, ] t and involves a representative household in the demand side and two sectors -energy and IT sectors -in the supply side. The economy has a constant population equal to 2L which is supplied inelastically as workforces, and the workforce endowment is equally allocated between energy and IT sectors, each with the same amount of
The preference of the representative household is specified as
where ρ is the time discount rate, and the household derives utility from consuming two end-use goods -energy products E C and IT products T C . The utility derived are additively separable, and the logarithmic preference is strictly increasing, concave, and twice differentiable for
and satisfies the Inada conditions. Moreover, the end-use energy goods stand for the numeraire in this economy, so throughout the price of final energy goods at each date is normalized to unity, and we denote the price of IT product T C by T P . 6 Characterizing the demand side also needs to specify the budget constraint of the household
where () At is the asset holdings of this household, 7 () rt is market interest rate, and  w t L ( ) 2 is income earnings of the household which inelastically supplies the constant workforce endowment. 1 ( ) ( , ) 1 .
(5) 8 To be specific, in addition to traditional fossil fuel-based energy technologies, energy sectors also involves a large number of differentiated varieties of primary energy technologies based on nuclear, hydropower, solar, wind, ocean wave, bioenergy, and geothermal etc. The variety-expanding model used here is closely related to and builds on the endogenous growth models, for example, Romer (1986 Romer ( , 1990 ); Smulders and de Nooij (2003) ; van Zon and Yetkiner (2003) ; Acemoglu et al. (2012) .
The demand for primary energy input variety [0, ( )] E i N t is determined by the representative firm that produces end-use, secondary energy products, and the problem of this end-use energy firm is described as maximization of the instantaneous flow profits at each point in time,
where the flow profit is obtained by subtracting the costs of using primary energy inputs and labor from the output of final energy production. The first-order necessary condition of this problem with respect to ( , ) E x i t yields the isoelastic demand for primary energy input variety [0, ( )]
The analysis proceeds to the primary energy firms that produce and supply each differentiated 
. . Once the technology blueprint for a particular primary energy variety is created, the monopolist can produce and supply one unit of that variety of primary energy at a marginal cost ψ (in unit of the final energy numeraire goods). Alternatively, the market value of each primary energy firm Eq. (8) can be rewritten in the Hamiltion-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) form,
where the HJB equation provides an inter-temporal no-arbitrage condition for primary energy firms.
The left-hand side corresponds to the cost of owning primary energy technology due to the loss of market interest rate. The right-hand side is the return from holding primary energy technology which stems from two sources -intertemporal changes in the market value and the current returns from instantaneous flow profit.
As compared to the development of IT-related devices, energy technology development is often characterized by capital-intensiveness in the sense that R&D activities in energy sectors need to intensively use "heavy" physical capital like hardware, equipments, and machines, thus creating a so-called "asset-heavy" pattern of innovation. To generate sustained energy technological progress, the "asset-heavy" innovation pattern requires allocating more and more resources from production outputs to finance R&D spending (Fri, 2003; Grubb, 2004; Worrell and Biermans, 2005; Sagar and van der Zwaan, 2006; Gallagher et al., 2006; Grübler et al., 1999 Grübler et al., , 2012 . Accordingly, in our model the innovation possibility frontier (IPF) of energy technology R&D takes the form as
.
where one unit of each variety of primary energy input is produced and supplied at the marginal cost of ψ in unit of the end-use energy goods (the numeraire).
IT Sectors
Relative to the homogeneity of end-use energy goods, IT products are substantially differentiated and heterogeneous in their attributes, characteristics and functions. Research leads to invention of new, differentiated IT-related consumer products that are valued directly by the household with love-for-variety preferences: the larger the number of the variety of IT products, the higher the utility derived from consumption. Technological progress in IT sectors can thus be viewed as a form of product innovation. Accordingly, the composite of IT product is specified as a CES aggregate of differentiate IT product varieties,
where () T Ct is the aggregate consumption of IT product composite at time t, and ( , )
Nt is the number of differentiated IT product varieties, with T ε denoting the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of IT products. Since IT products with substantial heterogeneity in attributes and functions are weakly substitutable in serving the household with love-for-variety preference, the value of T ε is sufficiently lower. For our exposition technological progress in IT sector is thus characterized by the expanding variety of IT products.
Given the Dixit-Stiglitz preference, the isoelastic demand function for individual IT product
with the ideal price index of IT product composite
where ( , ) T p j t is the price of IT product specific to a particular variety 
Due to the fact that the differentiated variety of IT consumer products are enjoyed directly by the love-for-variety household, the demand for IT product of the variety  T j N t [0, ( )] at each point in time is equal to the output supply of the corresponding IT firm that produces with a linear production function, 
where  TP w t l j t ( ) ( , ) is the labor costs of the firm to produce a quantity ( , ) 
where Eq. (19) characterizes the inter-temporal no-arbitrage condition for the market value of each IT monopolistic firms producing the corresponding differentiated variety of IT product.
As compared to the "asset-heavy" innovation pattern of energy technology, IT technology is often characterized by a lower intensity of heavy physical assets and a higher intensity of intangible assets like ideas, skills, and knowledge. For example, new-generation IT technologies are increasingly intertwined with digital software and programs, internet, and wireless network that de facto are free of heavy physical asset, creating a so-called "asset-light" mode of innovation. Accordingly, relative to energy technological innovation that intensively uses heavy capital such as hardware, equipments, and machines, innovation in IT sectors tends to employ workforces such as researchers as the key factors of undertaking R&D and knowledge creation. Moreover, given that R&D workforces are often scarce factors, IT sectors cannot sustain technological progress unless there is technology spillovers, making the scarce factors used in R&D increasingly productive over time (Dewan and Min. 1997; Jorgenson and Stiroh, 1999; Samuelson and Varian 2002; Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000; Varian 2000; Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999) . Accordingly, the innovation possibility frontier in IT sectors describing the law of motion of IT product variety takes the form as: 
where the left-hand side is the return from hiring one more workforce to undertake R&D for creating new IT product variety, which depends on the rate of variety expansion  () T η Nt and the market value of IT product variety
The RHS is the cost of employing one more workforce for R&D, that is, the equilibrium wage rate w . Finally, given that the workforces employed in IT sectors are allocated to both conventional output production and R&D-related technology creation, the labor market clearing condition in IT sector should satisfy 
Characterization of Market Equilibrium
Given the above-described model , a decentralized market equilibrium is defined as an allocation in which energy and IT firms choose This market-driven view that profit opportunities are the primary determinant of innovation is articulated in the seminal work of Schmookler (1962 Schmookler ( , 1966 , arguing that innovation is largely an economic activity which, like other economic activities, is pursued for profit gains. The studies by Griliches (1957) , and Griliches and Schmookler (1963) also provide empirical supports for the market-driven perspective that technological innovation is closely linked to the profitability in commercial markets. Similar conclusions are also reached in more recent studies, especially in the induced innovation literature. For example, Lichtenberg (1986) , Jaffe and Palmer (1997) , Newell et al. (1999) , Goulder and Schneider (1999) , Grubb et al. (2002) , Popp (2002) , and Acemoglu (2002) . (12)), the evolution of demand for and supply of IT product variety
is consistent with IT market clearing condition (Eq. (17)), the evolution of workforce employment
is consistent with labor market clearing condition (Eq. (22)), and the evolution of interest rate and wage rate
is consistent with market clearing.
Characterization of the market equilibrium begins with the demand side of the model. Solving the household's problem yields the dynamic equation that characterizes the time path of household consumption of final-use, secondary energy goods (see Appendix A for derivation),
and the time path of the aggregate consumption of IT product composite,
Turn to the supply side. Recall that, each energy monopolistic firm owning the blueprint of each differentiated variety of primary energy technology is motivated to maximize the intertemporal flow profits given in Eq. (8), which requires the maximization of instantaneous flow profit at each point in time. By solving this problem, the profit-maximizing choices of price, quantity, and profits made by primary energy firms can be determined, which is summarized by the following result.
Lemma 1 In the above-described model that features endogenous technological progress with an expanding variety of energy technology, given the isoelastic demand for primary energy input as given by Eq. (7), the energy monopolistic firm that produces and supplies each differentiated variety [0, ( )] E i N t of primary energy would charge a pricing rule as a constant markup over their marginal cost of production,
where ψ denotes the marginal cost of producing each primary energy input (in unit of the numeraire final energy goods), we set   E ψ ε 1 1 for normalization. Primary energy firm produces and supplies each variety of primary energy input with a quantity of
and obtain instantaneous flow profit,
Once the profit-maximizing choice of price is determined, it is straightforward to pin down the profit-maximizing choices of quantity, and profits as given in Eqs. (26)-(27). ■ Based on the Lemma 1, aggregating the whole set of primary energy inputs varieties obtains the total outputs of end-use, secondary energy products 
Proceeding analogously, consider IT sectors where each monopolistic firm owning the blueprint of each differentiated IT product variety is motivated to maximize the intertemporal flow profits given in Eq. (18), which requires the maximization of instantaneous flow profit at each point in time.
By solving the problem of profit maximization, the endogenous choices of price, quantity, and profits are summarized by the following result.
Lemma 2 In the above-described model that features endogenous technological progress with an expanding variety of IT, given the isoelastic demand for IT product variety as given by Eq. (15) , IT monopolistic firms that produce each IT product variety  T j N t [0, ( )] charge the profit-maximizing pricing rule as,
where the monopoly price is a constant markup over the wage rate (the marginal cost of production). The IT firms produces and supplies each variety of IT product with a quantity of
and obtains the instantaneous flow profit,
Proof. Given that the price charged 
Based on the output of each individual variety of IT product given in Eq. (31), the amount of aggregate consumption of IT product composite is determined by,
and the corresponding ideal price index of the IT product composite is given by,
Balanced Growth Path
We continue to characterize the balanced growth path (BGP) of the model. The BGP is defined as the steady state of this above-described market equilibrium where energy goods consumption () 11), the BGP level of market interest rate is given by, 
Given that the energy market clearing condition always holds
obtain that final energy consumption should grow at the same rate as the output of energy goods in the BGP. 10 Furthermore, Eq. (28) implies that the BGP growth rate of final energy goods outputs is equal to that of energy technology variety,
10 Differentiating the energy market clearing condition Eq. (12) with respect to time t obtains 
We thus obtain the BGP growth rate of the number of IT variety
and the BGP growth rate of consumption of IT product (according to Eq. (33))
These results concerning the BGP are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 In the above-described model that features endogenous technological progress with an expanding variety of energy technology and IT, there is a BGP in which the consumption of end-use secondary energy goods and the number of primary energy technology variety grow at a rate of * E g given by Eq. (37) . The BGP also requires that consumption of IT products grows at a rate of * T C g given by Eq. (41) , and the number of IT varieties increases at a rate of * T N g given by Eq. (40) . In particular, given that the elasticity of substitution of primary energy input variety is much larger than that of IT product variety, i.e.,  
Transitional Dynamics
This section will show that there is no transitional dynamics in the above-described model. Given that the flow profit ( , ) E π it is independent of primary energy variety as given in Eq. (27), the market value of energy firms is independent of primary energy variety and takes the form as 
and rearranging Eq. (43) obtains
where These results can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the above-described model that features endogenous technological progress with an expanding variety of energy technology and IT, given the initial stock of energy technology and IT variety Proof. The preceding discussion can establish all the claims in this proposition.
Social Optimal Allocation
In the above-described decentralized market equilibrium, monopolistic firms in both energy and IT sectors charge a markup in supplying their differentiated variety of primary energy input and IT product. The presence of monopoly markup in the market equilibrium thus leads to a Pareto suboptimal outcome where the number of technology variety used in the economy is not necessarily socially optimal. Then a next key issue arises: can a social planner achieve an outcome in which energy technology advances faster than IT? This issue will be addressed in this section.
To contrast the market equilibrium and social optimal allocation, we set up the social planner We proceed to rewriting the energy market clearing condition as (48) where the first term on the right-hand side is the output of final energy goods Eq. 
Substituting Eq. (49) into Eq. (48) obtains the energy market clearing condition
Meanwhile, for the market clearing condition in IT sector, the demand for each IT product variety
T j N t at each point in time is equal to the output supply of the corresponding IT firm with a linear production function  T T TP c j t y j t l j t ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) . The social planner maximizes the aggregate demand for IT product composite,
The optimal growth path is a solution to the social planner problem of maximizing the utility of the representative household Eq. (1), subject to the market clearing conditions Eq. (50), (53), and the innovation possibility frontiers for both energy and IT technology R&D,
Solving the social planner problem obtains the following result.
Proposition 3 In the above-described model that features endogenous technological progress with an expanding variety of energy technology and IT, the decentralized market equilibrium is Pareto suboptimal. In the social optimal allocation, energy technology variety expands at a growth rate of
(54)
Given that   E ε E ε 1 (1 ) 1 always holds when the elasticity of substitution is 1 E ε > , the social optimal growth rate of energy technology variety E S N g given in Eq. (54) is strictly larger than the market equilibrium growth rate of energy technology variety E N g given in Eq. (37) . Meanwhile, in the social optimal allocation the number of IT product variety expands at a growth rate of
which is also strictly greater than the market equilibrium growth rate of IT variety T N g given in Eq. (40) when the elasticity of substitution is 1 T ε > . Moreover, although the social planner can achieve an outcome in which the optimal growth rates of both energy technology and IT variety are strictly larger than their market equilibrium growth rates, energy technology still grows at a pace that is relatively lower than IT.
Proof. See Appendix C. ■ Proposition 3 provides the following economic intuitions. First, for technological progress in energy sectors with a form of process innovation, energy technology variety expands at a faster rate in social optimum. The source of inefficiency in market equilibrium is related to the monopoly markup charged by energy firms that supply differentiated intermediate primary energy inputs to the competitive final energy firms that produce homogenous secondary energy products (i.e., electricity). This monopoly markup lowers the potential demand for the number of differentiated primary energy input and thus the growth rate of energy technologya so-called pecuniary externality. Since the social planner charges no markup for pursuing the greater social value of innovation, the social optimum involves using a larger number of differentiated primary energy input and thus a higher rate of energy technological progress. 11
Second, for technological progress in IT sectors feature a form of product innovation, the source of inefficiency in market equilibrium is not due to the markup charged by monopolistic IT firms that supply differentiated variety of end-use IT products, because there is no impact of price markup on IT product consumption by the household with love-for-variety preferences and thus no efficiency 11
In the model, Eq. (49) gives the social optimal level of using individual primary energy variety,
. In contrast, in Eq. (7) the market equilibrium level of using each variety of primary energy input is given as
. Given
loss due to monopoly markup. 12 In fact, the source of inefficiency in IT sector is not because of the pecuniary externality isolated in energy sector but the non-pecuniary externality due to knowledge spillover. Given that the workforces such as researchers allocated to R&D are scarce factors, IT sector cannot sustain technological progress unless there is knowledge spillover -the current workforces "stand on the shoulders of past giants" and take advantage of the higher productivity of knowledge creation. Accordingly, in the market equilibrium IT firms disregard the non-pecuniary externality effect of their own efforts on raising the productivity of future innovative activity and undersupply the workforce for R&D. To internalize the technological externality due to knowledge spillovers, the social planner can achieve an efficiency-improving outcome by allocating more workforces to IT R&D. 13 Hence the social optimal growth rate of IT variety is larger than that in the market equilibrium.
Finally, as compared to the varieties of IT products that are weakly substitutable in serving the love-for-variety household, the differentiated varieties of primary energy are largely substitutable given that they are used as intermediate inputs to produce homogeneous end-use secondary energy products. The larger possibility of substitution implies that the monopoly power of primary energy firms supplying each differentiated primary energy input would be weaker, and efficiency losses in energy sectors due to the presence of monopoly markup would be lower in the market equilibrium.
In this case, when a social planner is introduced to correct for this distortion and improve efficiency, energy sectors can achieve an improvement in efficiency, but these efficiency gains would be small.
Therefore, in the social optimum the variety of both energy technology and IT can grow faster than that in the market equilibrium, but energy technology still grows at a pace that is lower than IT.
Policy Intervention in Market Equilibrium
When the social planner solution still cannot achieve an outcome in which energy technology grows faster than IT, this section considers some policy interventions for achieving that outcome in market equilibrium. One possible public policy that accelerates energy technological progress in market equilibrium is subsidizing energy R&D through non-distortionary taxation. With subsidies to energy technology research, the free-entry condition (FEC) of energy R&D now takes the form as 12 In the model, the structure of demand for individual IT product variety is the same between the social optimum and market equilibrium as given in Eq. (31) . 13 In the model, the socially optimal amount of workforce allocated to IT R&D is equal to
, as given in Eq. (C17) in Appendix C, and the market equilibrium amount of workforce allocated to IT R&D is equal to
] , as given in Eq. (39).
where R τ is the rate of subsidies to energy technology R&D, that is, one unit of R&D spending costs private energy firms 1 R τ units in the presence of R&D subsidy. R&D spending generates a flow rate η of new variety of energy technology blueprints, each with a market value given by Eq. (8) .
Given that the market value is equal to   EE Vt π t r t ε L r t 1 ( ) ( ) / ( ) / ( ) , substituting it into Eq. (56) obtains the market interest rate,
and the growth rate of energy technology variety,
As compared with the growth rate of IT variety given in Eq. (40), energy technology variety can grow faster than IT variety in the market equilibrium when the rate of energy R&D subsidy is set to satisfy the following condition 
and the growth rate of energy technology variety is given by
As compared with the growth rate of IT given in Eq. (40), energy technology variety can grow faster than IT variety in the market equilibrium when the subsidy to use intermediate primary energy is set to satisfy the following condition
Conclusion
A growing body of literature has pointed out the slow pace of energy technological progress as compared to other technologies like information technology (IT), but the underlying reasons why energy innovation is so slow still remain unexplained. This paper contributes to a rigorous economic exposition of the fundamental mechanism that explains the slow pace of energy technological innovation. Based on a variety-expanding endogenous technological change model, energy technological progress is described as the expanding variety of differentiated primary energy (i.e., coal, oil, gas, hydropower, solar, wind, geothemal, bioenergy) used to produce homogenous end-use, secondary energy goods (i.e., electric utility), and IT technological progress is represented as the expanding variety of differentiated end-use IT products that are directly valued by the household with a love-for-variety preference.
We show that in market equilibrium the growth rate of the number of energy technology variety is lower than that of IT variety. The key reasons are two-fold. First, although energy sector involves a variety of differentiated primary energy technology, end-use secondary energy goods (i.e., electric utility) consumed by the household have a substantial degree of homogeneity in terms of attributes and functions. Hence the effect of energy technological innovation is to increase the productivity of producing homogenous end-use, secondary energy products through an expanding variety of primary energy inputs (a form of process innovation). In contrast, end-use products in IT sectors are substantially heterogeneous in their attributes, characteristics and functions, and the effect of IT innovation is thus creating new variety of IT products that are directly consumed and valued by the love-for-variety household (a form of product innovation). In the market fundamentals, since the household derives greater utility when consuming a greater variety of differentiated products, the heterogeneous IT products is more likely to harness the pecuniary externality embedded in the household's love-for-variety preference, thus stimulating demand for creation of new IT product variety. In contrast, the homogeneity of end-use, secondary energy good becomes an inhibiting factor that dampens the pecuniary externality and the incentive of creating new energy variety.
Second, in technological fundamental technology development in energy sectors is characterized by an intensive use of heavy assets like hardware, equipments, and machines, creating a so-called "asset-heavy" pattern of innovation. To sustain technological progress, energy sectors require allocating more and more resources from production outputs to finance R&D spending. The capital-intensiveness of energy technology with an intensive use of rival physical assets thus becomes the factor that inhibits the non-pecuniary externality due to knowledge spillovers, slowing the pace of energy technology invention and diffusion. In contrast, the "asset-light" mode of IT innovation with an intensive use of intangible assets like ideas, skills, and knowledge is more likely to harness the technological externality due to knowledge spillovers for sustained technological progress, thus achieving a faster growth of IT innovation and diffusion.
Moreover, a social planner solution can boost energy technological progress, but still cannot achieve an outcome in which energy technology advances faster than IT. In the market equilibrium, this monopoly markup charged by energy monopolistic firms lowers the potential demand for the number of differentiated primary energy input and thus the growth rate of energy technology. The social planner charges no markup for pursuing the greater social value of innovation, and the social optimum thus involves using a larger number of differentiated primary energy input and a higher rate of energy technological progress. However, relative to the variety of IT products that are weakly substitutable in serving the love-for-variety household, the differentiated varieties of primary energy are largely substitutable given that they are used as intermediate inputs to produce homogeneous end-use secondary energy products. The larger possibility of substitution implies that the monopoly power of energy firms supplying each differentiated primary energy input would be weak, and efficiency losses in energy sectors due to the presence of monopoly markup would be small in the market equilibrium. In this case, when a social planner is introduced to correct for this distortion and improve efficiency, energy sectors can achieve an improvement in efficiency, but these efficiency gains would be small. Therefore, in the social optimum the variety of both energy technology and IT can grow faster than that in the market equilibrium, but energy technology still grows at a pace that is lower than IT. Given that the social planner solution still cannot achieve an outcome in which energy technology grows faster than IT, some efficiency-improving policies can be applied in the market equilibrium for accelerating the pace of energy technology progress. In particular, by targeting the subsidies on energy technology R&D and the use of intermediate primary energy inputs through non-distortionary taxation, the decentralized market equilibrium can achieve an outcome in which energy technology grows faster than IT. 
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